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It is notorious, though inconspicuous, that the poetry of Ted Hughes lies on the bedrock of a 
silenced cosmology. In another occasion, I have shown that that Weltanschauung was 
developed to the verge of articulation in Hughes' collaboration with Peter Brook in 1971 to 
the experimental play Orghast[1]. But there is no published or written text of Orghast, which 
leaves something like a silent hypertext at the core of Hughes' work. It is an imperfect silence, 
though, for A. C. H. Smith, who attended to that no doubt great moment of elucubration (the 
play was very much composed and acted by candlelight), took notes and later published a 
precious work for Hughesian scholars. In Orghast at Persepolis (1972), Smith explains most 
of the Blake-like, Yeats-like pantheon Hughes evolved, and, as an illustration, he also 
published a drawing the poet had made on a piece of foolscap, and which Smith entitled "Ted 
Hughes's physiology of Orghast" (92). This autonomous cosmo-logia is, literally, a silent 
anatomy.  
It may look complicated at first sight, but it is in fact exceedingly simple. At the heart of 
Hughes' cosmos is the fundamental principle of polemos, that conflict which Heraclitus 
evokes in his fragment 53 – "conflict is the father of everything, the king of everything; some 
he proves to be gods, others, men; some he turns into slaves, others, free men"[2]. The conflict 
which opposes KROGON (Prometheus' talkative head) to MOA (his silent belly), has its 
origin in the paradoxically cloven harmony of HOAN, the original pleroma. HOAN is 
represented as LIGHT in Orghast, and as the sun in this drawing. I take the oval form in the 
top right corner to possibly be a figuration of the original egg, the womb of all things. But in 
fact, in theological terms, it is a syzygy – from suzugoV (suzugos), the yoke -, it is both ONE 
and TWO at the same time. Like all eggs, this pleroma must either hatch or rot. And so it is 
paradoxically both plenitude and change. Æons succeed to æeons, represented, in part, by that 
waterfall of glands which cascade down the boby, cleaving it into two halves. But this idea of 
an original pleroma both opens time and the prospect of eternal conflict, and intimates the 
possibility of a paradise regained, which would be the end of conflict and of time. And, in the 
long duration, in due course of æons, there appears in Hughes' cosmology an inflexion, the 
beginning of an end, a prospect of redemption. Like the titans of Greek mythology, Hughes' 
Prometheus is the son of the first gods.  
But, unlike his Greek homonym, he is one and only, he is everything – "The unity fractured in 
this way is PRAMANATH (Prometheus), the divine self of creation in human form" (Smith 
94). The whole cosmos is equivalent to the anthropomorphic body of Prometheus. Merely to 
glance at Hughes' drawing brings confirmation of this, the conflicting entities are located both 
inside and outside his standing body. MOA is what he is standing on as well as what he has in 
his stomach. KROGON is roosting on his head, but its beak and claws penetrate him so 
deeply that it has become one with him. The original light, HOAN, is represented as shining 
behind him, in the sky, but it is also the flame he has in his bowels. And there, it is 
represented both in its spherical form of original purity, and under its degrades species, 
USSA, MOASHA, FURORG. Man and woman are also part of this body. So Prometheus is 
one with everything, and, if it is possible to conceive of him as occupying one moment of the 
mythology, he is first and foremost the very topos in which the mythology is embodied.  
Pramanath is himself Light, creative fire, the original single substance. He is also the Sun and 
Moa, as the divine created self reproduces in itself these energies, and enjoys them in human 
form. His wisdom is the natural law of the universe, since the substance of the universe is 
what he is. His foreknowledge is complete, his knowledge of the divine harmony, and the 
harmonies into which it multiplies in the created world, is complete (Smith 94).  
It is very clear, form this, that Prometheus is characterized best by his completeness. He is 
light and original matter. He is one with HOAN. But at the same time, like the original 
pleroma, he is cloven. Like the syzygy, he is of a paradoxical essence, being both the one and 
the many. He is complete but cloven, single but several, union but division.  
But he is fractured. He is the crossroads of eternal light and ecstasy, and temporal doom, pain, 
change and death. Conscious in eternity, he has to live in time. And he cannot solve his 
dilemma. He hangs between heaven and earth, almost torn apart, an open wound, immortal 
(94).  
Now, and this is a crucial point indeed, this defines Prometheus as the incarnation of the 
symbol itself. And by symbol, I mean the tessera, that small tablet used as a token of a human 
contract, for it has been broken into two pieces, the matching of which is as unique as a 
fingerprint. Without necessarily seeing any religious implications in that, it may be worth 
noticing that Ted Hughes (1930-1998), together with Jacques Lacan (1901-1981), mentions 
the cross as the most elementary symbol. When Smith, for Hughes, speaks of a "crossroad" 
between eternity and death – "He is the crossroads of eternal light and ecstasy, and temporal 
doom, pain, change and death" – Lacan says "cross" and "intersecting" to evoke what defines 
humanity – "the symbol par excellence, the one by which man will always be known to have 
been here, by the cross man draws, intersecting access and closure"[3].  
The proximity of this to the Christian ethos should not be a surprise. Neither is it merely a 
matter of words. Both Prometheus and Christ are crucified, but there is more to this picture. It 
lies in this definition of Prometheus, which looks back to the very beginning of the mythology 
of Orghast and the definition of light. Indeed, "Pramanath is himself Light, creative fire, the 
original single substance". One should read this while bearing in mind the similarity of 
Hughes' vision with Heraclitus' notion of fire. For Heraclitus, the original fire is the logos. 
And Heidegger, who knew the pre-socratic philosopher well, offered a definition of this 
heraclitean logos which does cast some light on the question. It matches Lacan's definition of 
the symbol –  
But logos dos not primarily mean speech, saying. The same word stand for nothing that is 
directly related to language. Lego, legein, in Latin legere, is the same as our col-ligate; 
"lecture" is only one kind of "colligating". That word means the putting one thing beside 
another, putting them together, in a word, gathering them; in that operation, things are 
simultaneously distinguished from one another[4].  
The only difference is a considerable one, for Heidegger denies any "immediate" relation of 
this to language. Yet, in a "mediate" way, precisely, there seems to be some relation indeed 
between the two things he wishes to separate, since he chooses "lecture" or reading as the best 
example of what he is demonstrating. Now, language consists precisely in that – 
distinguishing to articulate, murdering to dissect, bringing together in a necessarily alienating 
manner, mediating in the very effort of apprehending. Whether Hughes is ready to recognize 
it or not, that make Prometheus and embodiment of logos in the Heraclitean sense of the term. 
Even for Heidegger, who advances with caution, "Logos is Christ" (135). Like Christ, 
Prometheus may be defined as the Word Incarnate, for "Word" and "Logos" are equivalent at 
least in so far as they both refer to Iahveh's "I AM" (Exodus 3 : 13 – 14), that on which the 
symbolic law is founded. And Prometheus' symbolic gift of fire to mankind is the gift of 
language. Prometheus and Light are one. And Smith insists that, in Orghast, fire and language 
are one and the same thing – "The gift of fire and the gift of language have the same 
meaning : both are the gift of specific humanity to man, distinguishing culture from nature, 
will from instinct, the cooked from the raw" (.i.Smith 37). This can only be questioned in a 
polemical, dualistic vision of things, which Hughes tends to adopt, for whom logos is only 
separation, and can only be the contrary of colligation.  
But be it as may, though, it will soon be clear that Prometheus is not Christ. And I suspect that 
Hughes' choice of precisely this hero is partly motivated by this very ressemblance and its 
potentially subversive dimension. The confusion is directly cultivated elsewhere, in poems 
like "Take What You Want But Pay For It" (Wolfwatching 42 – 44). And the mere fact that a 
confusion be possible allows the myth of Prometheus to work as a counter-myth to the 
crufixion of Christ. Yet, Prometheus is not a historical character, he is not a god, and not 
exactly a man; he is a hero, and first of all a myth, in the sense that Prometheus is an icon of 
logos.  
Now all that is not only a form of very recondite cerebration. It is the metaphysical and 
mythical spine of Hughes' poetry. As a system, it works; as a cosmology, it operates in his 
poems. One clear example is to be found in Prometheus On His Crag, which opens as the 
hero starts speaking  
A world of holy, happy notions shattered  
By the shout  
That brought Prometheus peace  
And woke the vulture (Moortown 73).  
"The shout", or what is here thought as a very access to speech, the primordial cry or howl, is 
warped, as a concept, on the side of disruption, in terms that make it a paradox. This access is 
a closure; this violent opening of conflict is also the alliance meant by peace. And this 
shattering of the unique original world is at the same time a collapsing of the several and of 
the conceptualized. Under superficial simplicity lies the essential paradox. Should Prometheus 
have remained silent, should he have said nothing as before, and there would have been no 
vulture to tear him to pieces. Now here we are, at the threshold of an axiology, where logos is 
bad, and silence better.  
Prometheus, an icon of logos, is a wounded anthropomorphic body – "He hangs... an open 
wound, immortal". But living bodies have this marvellous power, they cicatrize. And the 
metaphor of the wounded body feeds the hope of one day healing up the wound opened by 
speech, of sometime bridging the gap of language. That is the old pagan myth of Prometheus, 
whose liver is daily eaten by the eagle of Zeus, but heals up every night. And this is one major 
difference with Christ, who may have been resurrected from the dead, but never really 
recovered from his wounds. And what Hughes is interested in (and interesting for) is that the 
opportunity remains open for the organic tissue to grow back, and for the horrible bird to be 
annihilated. And such is the destiny of Pramanath. He is one of the sons of MOA, which she 
gives birth to to the sole end of destroying the tyrant. His condition is comparable to that of 
all the sons of KROGON and MOA, he is imprisoned and mutilated by his father :  
He is born into time as Krogon's child, SOGIS. His destiny, as with all Moa's sons, is to 
destroy Krogon. He suffers the imprisonment of the heir to the throne. Sunken in the 
degenerating matter of the crazy Moa, he is inwardly blind and no longer able to see his part 
in the design (Smith 95).  
As a son, he is at once the place and the stake of the conflict between the two poles of the 
dualism. He may either be conquered by KROGON, and become his heir, another KROGON. 
Or else, aided by MOA, he may "kill Krogon and cure the universe" (95). He is this 
becoming, he is this undecidedness. And, much as Freud spoke of the destinies of impulses in 
Metapsychology, Prometheus has two possible destinies, embodied in two avatars – SOGIS 
and AGOLUZ. SOGIS is his destiny such as MOA conceives it; he is the redeemer. And 
AGOLUZ is said to be an equivalent of Heracles, the classical hero who, in some versions of 
the myth, frees Prometheus. But in Hughes, he is rather appreciated for other tasks of his.  
When he is launched against KROGON, AGOLUZ fails, because he enters a dialectic of 
logos, a "dia-logic" as it were, which actuates KROGON into existence, like the rough beast 
and his centuries of sleep which "Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle" in Yeats' 
"Second Coming" (211). The vulture partly is the materialization of this awakened force of 
disruption. To use another complicated Hughesian and Heraclitean term, that makes 
AGOLUZ the hero of enantio-dromia, which is literaly le running in the opposite way. For he 
is indeed the hero of enantio-logia, or contradiction. And by contradicting KROGON, he puts 
himself in the position of being conquered by the tyrant, and becomes a mirror image of him, 
reproducing him. "Agoluz's role is to convert the Krogonishness inherent in himself (his real 
father being Krogon) to a sane, rational, albeit limited and partial order, which is workable". 
AGOLUZ becomes the civilized and rational hero of humanity, but by doing so, perpetuates 
the crime against Moa, or the silent body of nature :  
As Sogis releases Ussa and comes near to killing his father, and does in fact reduce him to a 
chattering vicious bird, so Agoluz kills his wife and children, thinking they are evil birds, but 
now knows the cure for his father, which is to unriddle the Vulture, the evil bird (96).  
What I find instructive is that it shows that the reason why AGOLUZ fails is that by killing 
KROGON, he perpetuates conflict itself, that polemos which Heraclitus says is the universal 
father. Thus Hughes brings a sort of no doubt involuntary codicil confirmation to Freudian 
theory, which is that to kill the father is to perpetuate the father. This is rather commonplace, 
but it is the way in which AGOLUZ helps defining SOGIS as his opposite. SOGIS is the 
alternative destiny. Starting from MOA's desire to kill KROGON, when SOGIS arrives in the 
arena, he lays down his arms and stops fighting.  
Sogis frees Ussa. All the voices that called her to assassinate Krogon now call on Sogis, and 
he pauses, hearing instructions from every corner of heaven and earth. Then the voice of 
Light warns him. As the voice speaks, Krogon withers to an imbecile, senile, birdlike thing, 
croaking empty sounds. But his violent nature remains : he is caged.  
Sogis releases the Sun and marries the Light as it is embodied in this latest representative of 
Moa, Ussa. Simultaneously the Sun, Moa and Light reunite, and the universe flows through 
its full circuit, materialized spirit and spiritualized matter, undivided and reconciled to itself 
(95).  
In much more simple and concrete terms, SOGIS is the ideal of the hero at the end of the 
short story "The Rain Horse", who "longed to stretch out full-length... and forget himself in 
the last wretchedness of the mud" (Difficulties of a Bridegroom 77). He is also the knight, in 
Cave Birds, whose conquest is paradoxically a surrender – "Has conquered. He has 
surrendered everything" (28). Hughes' Sogis is an icon of logos as colligation.  
Thus it is that Hughes' Prometheus enables the formulation of that myth of a hero, or a super-
man, who would manage to free himself from the alienation of language. Prometheus does not 
war, but weds. He marries MOA with KROGON. In other words, he ideally merges the 
disruptive anatomy of logos with the cohesive autonomy of silence. In other words, still, he is 
an anti-Christ in the sense that he is the myth of anti-logos. It is also a mythical expression of 
C. G. Jung's ideal of an integrated Self, who could merge the conscious with the 
subconscious, marry the "outer world of things" with the "inner world of spirits". To sum it up 
in a word, Hughes nurture the dream of a human condition undivided from nature, and builds 
the myth of an ana-logos, a proportionate relation of man to the world. And his poetry can be 
read as the practice of a new, anti-anatomical tongue, which would no longer "murder to 
dissect" (Wordsworth 105), but would rather, as Stéphane Mallarmé put it, remunerate the 
defect of tongues – "seulement, sachons,n'existerait pas le vers : lui, philosophiquement 
rémunère le défaut des langues" (364).       
NOTES:  
[1] "La jouissance dans les poèmes de Ted Hughes", Le corps dans tous ses états, Ed. Marie-
Claire Rouyer, Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 1995.  
[2] "Le conflit est père de toutes choses et roi de toutes choses; dans les uns il relève des 
dieux, dans les autres des hommes, des uns il fait des esclaves, des autres des hommes libres" 
(106-7).  
[3] "[C'est] le symbole par excellence, celui auquel se reconnaîtra toujours le passage de 
l'homme quelque part, par la croix qu'il dessine, entrecroisant l'accès et la clôture" (Lacan, Le 
séminaire, II 347).  
[4] "Mais logos ne signifie pas originairement discours, dire. Le mot même ne désigne rien 
qui se rapporte d'une façon immédiate au langage. Lego, legein, en latin legere, c'est le même 
mot que notre col-liger; la "lecture" n'est qu'une espèce du "colliger". Ce mot signifie : poser 
une chose à côté d'une autre, les mettre ensemble, bref : rassembler; dans cette opération les 
choses sont en même temps distinguées les unes des autres" (Heidegger, Introduction à la 
métaphysique 132).  
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